In IEEE 802.11 networks, selfish stations can pursue a better quality of service (QoS) through selfish MAC-layer attacks. Such attacks are easy to perform, secure routing protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex. Twohop relay topologies allow a new angle of attack: a selfish relay can tamper with either source traffic, transit traffic, or both. We consider the applicability of selfish attacks and their variants in the two-hop relay topology, quantify their impact, and study defense measures.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE coverage of IEEE 802.11 networks can be extended if stations connected to an access point (AP) act as relays, i.e., they share their connection with other, neighboring stations, who either cannot reach the AP themselves or have a poor direct connection to it. This approach creates a twohop relay network ( Fig. 1) which is known to have many advantages in terms of network coverage and performance [1] .
A two-hop relay network requires cooperation from the relay station. Suppose it declares cooperation, which its neighboring stations confirm to the AP via a dedicated authenticated message. In return, the relay station gains a privileged status at the AP, e.g., enjoys better terms of network access. However, it is now also motivated to launch selfish attacks resulting in preferential treatment for its own (source) traffic over relayed (transit) traffic, hence to achieve an undue increase of the quality of service (QoS) [2] . Indeed, an undetected selfish attack is more beneficial for the relay station than a refusal to forward offered transit traffic, in which case the privileged status is revoked.
Selfish attacks can be launched in two ways. First, packet scheduling in the forwarding path can be biased in favor of source traffic. Second, source packets can be unduly prioritized at the MAC-layer. Since it is the MAC mechanisms that ultimately decide the order and delays of medium acquisition by successive packets (Section II), in what follows we focus on MAC-layer attacks defined in Section III.
Selfish MAC-layer attacks pose a serious threat to IEEE 802.11 networks: they are easy to perform, secure routing protocols do not prevent them, and their detection may be complex [2] . These attacks have been studied in single-hop networks [3] . However, the two-hop relay topology adds another dimension to the problem, in that the relay can tamper with either source traffic, or transit traffic, or both ( Fig. 1) . We consider the applicability of these attacks and their variants in the two-hop relay topology (Section IV), quantify their impact (Section V), and study defense measures (Section VI).
II. QOS PROVISIONING IN IEEE 802.11 NETWORKS QoS provisioning in IEEE 802.11 is achieved through the enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA) function, where higher-layer traffic classes are mapped to queues of one of four access categories (ACs). The ACs, in order of decreasing priority, are voice (VO), video (VI), best effort (BE), and background (BK). The configuration of each AC (Table I) provides statistical prioritization with respect to channel access and duration.
Traffic classification into ACs is based on the Distributed Services Code Point (DSCP) set in a packet's IP header (in the Type of Service field in IPv4 or Traffic Class field in IPv6). DSCP values can be configured according to higher-layer policies, using network-layer packet mangling software (such as Linux iptables) for all packets belonging to a given flow. and traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Both can be executed either as source traffic upgrading or transit traffic downgrading ( Fig. 1 ), which we denote ( + ) and ( − ), respectively.
III. SELFISH ATTACKS

A. Backoff Attacks
BOAs belong to the class of MAC parameter manipulation attacks -out of the available medium access parameters ( Table I) the contention window (CW) has proved to be the easiest to manipulate [4] , [5] . The CW governs the backoff mechanism, wherein each station backs off before accessing the channel by waiting a random number of time slots. An attacker may attempt to influence this random behavior so as to improve its QoS, either by decreasing CW for the AC of source traffic (BOA + ) or increasing it for transit traffic (BOA − ).
BOAs have two key advantages. First, modifying MAC parameters is often available as part of the command-line or graphical configuration interface. Second, detecting BOAs is challenging to detect due to both the randomness inherent to the backoff function as well as the practical difficulties in performing precise time measurements.
The BOA + attack has mostly been studied in a single-hop infrastructure-based WLAN setting and shown to effectively promote the attacker's traffic [4] . In a two-hop topology, a BOA − can additionally be applied to transit traffic to discriminate it in favor of source traffic. Initial reports have shown that in multi-hop networks such attacks can improve the attacker's source throughput more effectively compared to BOA + [6] .
Research is required to quantify the impact of BOAs in twohop relay settings and in combination with TRAs.
B. Traffic Remapping Attacks
TRAs consist in claiming a different medium access priority through false DSCP settings so that traffic can be mapped onto a different AC. TRAs are simpler to perform than BOAs: a user application can access packet mangling software to change the current DSCP of any packet.
TRAs have been studied in single-hop ad hoc networks [3] , where a distributed discouragement scheme, based on the threat of detection and punishment, allows TRAs only if they are harmless to honest stations; otherwise it induces selfish stations to learn that a long-sustained TRA is counterproductive. For relay networks, TRAs can be performed also on transit traffic to lower its priority (TRA − ). Such a possibility has thus far only been studied in a multi-hop network [7] , necessitating further research.
IV. TWO-HOP RELAY TOPOLOGY
We make the following assumptions for analyzing the network in Fig. 1 . Station B and the AP are out of communication range. The placement of A in the topology allows the execution of any one of the previously discussed attacks. For ease of presentation we reduce the configuration space assuming that only two ACs are used: VO and BE, representing high and low priority traffic, respectively. The interesting case for analysis is when, at A, the transit flow T is VO and the source flow S is BE. We evaluate the attack performance under saturation traffic with TCP used at the transport layer. 
A. Uplink and Downlink Scenarios
In the uplink scenario, there are two saturated TCP data flows terminating at the AP upon which A can execute the attacks: S, referred to as the source flow, and T, referred to as the transit flow. A's goal is to improve its uplink throughput (i.e., that of S). There are also traffic flows carrying TCP ACK segments in the reverse direction: S and T (omitted from Fig. 1 for clarity) . These two flows are important: although they have a low rate, they impact the time spacing of the TCP data and thus end-to-end throughput of flows S and T.
A downlink scenario can also be considered, where the saturated TCP data flows are T and S . Note that again A can directly influence T and S, the latter now consisting of TCP ACKs for flow S . A's goal is now to improve its downlink throughput (i.e., that of S ). Single-hop network studies have shown that MAC-layer attacks have no serious impact on downlink throughput [8] . Whether this holds for two-hop relay settings is an open question that we want to address.
B. Attack Strategies
For each attack strategy it is helpful to specify which AC queues are used at the attacker, how they are configured, and which traffic is sent using which AC (Table II) . For BOAs, we assume that AC queues are configured with valid EDCA parameters, e.g., in BOA + the BE AC queue is configured with VO parameters. Note that BOA + and TRA + differ in their effects even though they share the same AC configuration for S and T; similarly for BOA − and TRA − . This is because under BOA + and BOA − both AC queues are used, whereas TRA + and TRA − merge source and transit traffic into a single AC queue, causing less inter-queue contention at the MAC layer. They also modify the QoS designation of each packet, which impacts its end-to-end as well as TCP ACK transmission priority, whereas BOA + and BOA − have local impact only.
BOAs and TRAs can also be combined into more sophisticated attack strategies. In particular, BOA + and BOA − (2xBOA) can be combined to produce a priority switch between the source and transit traffic flows (S and T). A similar priority switch is produced by a combination of TRA + and TRA − (2xTRA).
In combinations of BOA and TRA, the TRA component assigns both flows to the same AC queue, for which the BOA component sets the EDCA parameters; as a result, the provided QoS depends on various factors including the number of contending stations. Therefore, combinations of BOA and TRA come under EDCA performance optimization rather than network security, and as such are outside our scope. In light of the above, we henceforth consider only 2xBOA and 2xTRA.
V. ATTACK IMPACT ANALYSIS
To study the impact of the considered attacks we used the ns-2.28 simulator. A multi-hop IEEE 802.11 HR/DSSS 1 network served the three stations in Fig. 1 . The provided QoS is defined based on a flow's intrinsic AC: as packet delay for VO traffic, i.e., T (which according to ITU-T recommendations should not exceed 100 ms), and as achieved throughput for BE traffic, i.e., S or S in the uplink or downlink scenario, respectively 2 . The selfish relay A attempts to maximize the throughput of S or S at the cost of the victim flow T while maintaining a low risk of detection. We have simulated all attack strategies available to A (Table II) . We have omitted from the figures attack strategies combining BOA and TRA (indicated above as out of scope), as well as 2xBOA, which was found only a marginal improvement over stand-alone BOA − (the contribution of BOA + turned out to be negligible).
A. Uplink Scenario
In the uplink scenario, from A's perspective, significant throughput gains of S can be achieved by attacking ( Fig. 2a ). However, it is visible that BOA + (where A uses both BE and VO queues configured with VO parameters) is not beneficial in two-hop relay settings. The reason is that, in addition to the inter-queue contention that worsens the overall performance, the VO queue used by T retains its relative priority: the TCP ACKs for T are handled as VO traffic at the AP, creating a smaller round-trip time (RTT) than that experienced by S (whose TCP ACKs are handled as BE traffic). Under TRA + , flow S approaches the throughput achieved by T with A's honest behavior (the reference line in Fig. 2b ). The downgrading attacks provide even better gains, which supports the hypothesis that upgrading source traffic is less important than downgrading transit traffic and elimination of inter-queue contention (note that compared to BOA − , TRA − yields slightly better gains because it causes the AP to handle TCP ACKs for T as BE traffic). However, 2xTRA is strikingly beneficial.
The throughput gains of S are accompanied by the loss in throughput by T (Fig. 2b) . In most cases the loss ranges between 30% and 50% with the exception of 2xTRA, where 90% of the throughput is lost. Delay in all but the last case 1 Simulations were also performed for IEEE 802.11 OFDM with the same qualitative results. 2 The 95% confidence intervals are either presented in the figures or were too narrow for graphical representation.
is below the ITU-T requirement of 100 ms (Fig. 2c ). This shows that some selfish attacks can be harmless (inflict no QoS degradation for T), even in saturation conditions.
B. Downlink Scenario
In the downlink scenario both BOA + and TRA + provide a small (3-5%) throughput gain for S by increasing the sending rate of the corresponding TCP ACKs at the price of increased collision rate due to smaller CW values (Fig. 2d) . BOA − and TRA − reduce the collision rate due to larger CW values, therefore are much more beneficial for A; BOA − slightly less so because, as explained in Section V-A, the VO queue used by T still has relative priority despite being configured with BE parameters, whereas TRA − eliminates the inter-queue contention at A. Unexpectedly for A, 2xTRA performs no better than TRA − . The reason is that the TRA + component has TCP ACKs for flow S handled as VO traffic at A. Thus S experiences a lower RTT and its transmit window is excessively expanded; the resulting increased collisions at the AP ultimately lower the throughput of S . In all considered downlink cases, T's delay, though sometimes elevated beyond the reference value (representing A's honest behavior), meets the ITU-T requirement of 100 ms (Fig. 2f ).
VI. DEFENSE MEASURES
Once detected, selfish MAC-layer attacks can be easily punished by revoking the privileged status at the AP or banning the attacker from further communication (by deauthentication and blacklisting). However, the detection would then have to be fail-safe lest the attacker present the case to a network manager for adjudication; besides, no further cooperation would then be offered by the attacker. A more convenient approach is to provide incentives for honest cooperation. For example, if the AP suspects that some node is an attacker, it can drop ACK frames for the attacker's source packets or shape the attacker's source traffic; both these measures can be considered a subtler form of punishment by denial of service (DoS). We evaluate them in the topology of Fig. 1 in the uplink scenario to show that they involve only a small computational overhead on behalf of the AP and no transmission overhead at all.
The first measure, dropping ACK frames [4] , has the punisher refrain from sending MAC-layer ACK frames for correctly received DATA frames belonging to the attacker's flow (S in the uplink scenario and S in the downlink scenario). The degree of penalty can be scaled by acknowledging an α ∈ [0, 1] portion of frames.
The second measure, traffic shaping, has the punisher apply traffic control to TCP flows related to the attacker's traffic (S in the uplink scenario and S in the downlink scenario), e.g., in the form of a leaky bucket filter with a controlled output rate. This rate can be proportional, by α ∈ [0, 1], to the attacker's rate during an attack, so that for α = 1 the throughput of S is equal to that shown in Fig. 2a .
The results presented in Fig. 3 show that ACK dropping was able to scale S's throughput for the downgrading attacks. However, for the upgrading attacks, dropping ACKs can inadvertently optimize S's TCP flow with respect to the effect
Attack strategy of j of hidden stations and thus cause an unexpected increase of S's throughput for α ∈ [0.4, 0.9]. We have also evaluated the performance of flow T (not shown) and observed that for TRA − the throughput is reduced for both S and T; clearly, ACK dropping has caused network performance degradation. In contrast, traffic shaping allowed to selectively (and almost linearly) control the throughput of S. Similar results (not presented here) were obtained in the downlink scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Based on the above analysis, our main findings are: 1) as long as the QoS requirements of high-priority traffic are met, the selfish attacks can be considered harmless, 2) unlike in single-hop networks, where it has been most widely studied, BOA + brings the attacker no benefit in two-hop relay networks because it does not modify the packet's QoS designation, 3) downgrading attacks perform better than their upgrading counterparts (particularly in the downlink scenario), while combined attack strategies were found to be only beneficial in one case (2xTRA in the uplink scenario), 4) ACK dropping, while effective in single-hop WLANs, cannot be viewed as a valid punishment in two-hop relay networks because of its unpredictable behavior.
